This paper explores whether social interactions influence investors' decisions to hold equity and allocate their portfolios, in the context of defined contribution retirement savings accounts. Using a rich dataset of 401(k) plans, we provide empirical evidence that participants are influenced by their coworkers when they make equity investment decisions. Specifically, we show that individuals are likely to increase their risky share if their peers earned higher equity returns in the past period relative to average returns; they are also likely to decrease their risky share when past peer equity returns are strongly negative. These results are consistent with the limited attention hypothesis that people are more likely to pay attention to significant outcomes. 
I. Introduction
Standard portfolio choice models typically make the assumption that individual investors are fully informed and thus make independent asset allocation decisions to maximize their lifetime utility. Yet economists have long noticed that many individuals make economic decisions based on information received via social interaction.
1 Several studies have found that such word-of-mouth communication has a strong influence on investors' decisions to enter the stock market, 2 but no previous work explores whether social interactions also affect the extent of risk exposure among investors. This paper examines the influence of word-of-mouth communication among participants in the most rapidly growing form of pensions in the United States, namely 401(k) plans.
1 Social interaction effects are found in various economic settings including criminal activities (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 1996) , social group membership acquisition (Sacerdote 2001) , and automobile choices (Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Ikaheimo, 2008) . 2 See Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) , Brown, Ivkovic, Smith, and Weisbenner (2008) , and Kaustia and Knupfer (2010) .
Our focus is on how peer interactions influence the extent to which individuals hold equities in their retirement accounts. We show that social interactions have direct and measurable effects on 401(k) plan investors' equity exposure. Using data from the Vanguard Group covering over 600 defined contribution (401(k)) plans and their participants, we track monthly trading and contribution records as well as participant residential ZIP codes to identify both individual and peer effects. We confirm that 401(k) investors are more likely to increase their equity holdings after their peers have enjoyed higher returns on their own equities in the past period. This effect is stronger in workplaces where the equity exposure rate is high, suggesting that risk-loving people are more likely to be impressed by short-term excess equity returns and increase their risk exposure. Furthermore, investors also decrease their equity holdings after their peers experience substantially negative equity returns. To make sure that our results are not driven by other mechanisms, we run multiple robustness checks to rule out alternative explanations.
Our unique dataset from Vanguard gives us an opportunity to examine social interaction effects within workplaces. Our sample of close to two million observations contains the ZIP code of each individual's residence. This allows us to explore social interaction among workers within the same firm and city. We consider this to be an improvement upon prior studies on peer effects, where "peers" are typically defined as people living within the same city or ZIP code. Our approach allows us to explore peer effects in much smaller communities, where people are much closer in their relationships.
Our dataset also includes abundant variables of investor characteristics and financial conditions, as well as monthly updated individual contribution and trading records. We take advantage of the richness of our dataset to make various controls in our analysis.
Our study is related to a growing literature on peer influence in investment decisions. In view of the fact that the average 401(k) investor's financial knowledge is limited (Lusardi and Mitchell 2009) , it is reasonable to suspect that people may solicit peers' advice when making investment decisions. Selective communication models
suggest that people may enjoy discussing stock market investments with their colleagues when they enjoy high returns on equities (Festinger, 1957, Benabou and Tirole, 2002) .
There is also evidence that people may align their investments with the investments of people in their social group, doing so to "keep up with the Joneses" (Bernheim 1994) . If so, people may increase their equity exposure when their peers experience a positive outcome in the market. Furthermore, this can have an aggregate impact if asset prices rise with market participation. Thus, holding more equity can have a direct influence on the equity premium, as shown by Heaton and Lucas (2000) . Other analysts have also suggested that large inflows of funds can generate momentum returns (Jegadeesh and Titman 2001) . To our knowledge, we are the first to explore whether these patterns are applicable in the pension arena.
We outline the rest of the paper as follows. Section II reviews the previous literature. Section III introduces the data. Section IV discusses the empirical strategy, and presents the results. Section V provides robustness checks. We conclude in Section VI.
II. Previous Literature
Social interaction has long been considered an important factor in influencing people's economic decision-making. Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) present models of social interaction as a means of observational learning, and Bernheim (1994) models the "keeping up with the Joneses" effect, i.e. people trying to conform to the social group to which they belong. Cao and Hirshleifer (2009) discuss why people may converge upon poor decisions as a result of group communication.
However, Manski (1993 Manski ( , 2000 argues that empirically identifying social interaction is difficult since unobserved variables may induce a spurious correlation between individual choices and peer choices. Nevertheless, a large body of research uses various identification strategies to explore the social interaction effect in various economic settings, including criminal activities (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 1996) , social group membership acquisition (Sacerdote 2001) , automobile choice (Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Ikaheimo 2008) , office selection (Topa, Bayer, and Ross 2009) , and health plan choice (Sorensen 2006) .
There is also a set of studies examining how social interaction influences investment decisions in practice. Shiller and Pound (1989) report survey evidence indicating that investors ask their friends for trading ideas. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) , and Brown, Ivkovic, Smith, and Weisbenner (2008) find that regular investors are more prone to participate in the stock market when more of their neighbors are investing in stocks. Using other datasets, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) , Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007) , and Shive (2010) all find that trades of mutual fund managers and retail investors in the same neighborhood are correlated. These studies mostly focus on action-based social learning, or in other words, people mimicking their neighbors' investment actions, without considering the influence of peer outcomes.
In contrast with these works, Kaustia and Knupfer (2011) examine how peer outcomes affect individual investment decision-making. Specifically, using stock market data from Finland, they find that people are more likely to enter the stock market when their neighbors enjoyed higher returns in the past period. The present paper is related to this work, in that we also use peer equity returns as the main vehicle for identifying social interactions. However, unlike other studies, we focus not on the decision to enter the stock market, but on how the share of risky investments within 401(k) accounts is influenced by peer returns.
We are also interested in contributing to the growing literature on 401(k) investment patterns. Many authors have shown that financial literacy among U.S.
workers is low, including Mitchell (2006, 2008) who report that only one third of respondents in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) can correctly answer correctly three simple questions about inflation, compound interest, and risk diversification. This is important since the least financially literate are also least wellprepared for retirement Mitchell, 2006, 2007) . They are also less likely to invest in stocks (Kimball and Shumway, 2006 , van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2007 , Yoong, 2007 . In view of this widespread financial illiteracy, we can see why employees will tend to talk to others at the workplace in search of information. There is evidence that employee saving behavior is strongly affected by plan sponsor behavior, particularly the default contribution rate and asset allocation in 401(k) plans (Madrian and Shea, 2001 ). In research closer to ours, Duflo and Saez (2002) show that people's decision to enroll in a retirement plan is directly affected by co-worker behavior. In what follows, we extend this literature to evaluate whether peers influence not only stock market participation, but also portfolio risk exposure.
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We analyze a proprietary dataset from the Vanguard Group on 401(k) pension plans administered by that firm. Vanguard is one of the largest 401(k) plan administrators in the U.S., and the plans cover a wide rage of industries, with a large variation in plan size and fund choices. The dataset also includes a number of investor characteristics including age and sex, financial characteristics including household income and nonretirement financial wealth 3 , and, invaluable for our purposes, the ZIP code of each respondent's residence. The administrative records include individual contribution and trading records updated monthly.
Previous studies of social interaction effect typically define "community" or "neighborhood" as people living in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) (Brown, Ivkovic, Smith, and Weisbenner 2008, Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2005) or ZIP code (Kaustia and Knupfer, 2011, Shive, 2010) . One drawback to these approaches is that when community is defined in this way usually includes a very large population and covers a large geographical area. Accordingly, this could easily dilute the true effect of peer-to-peer communication. As an example, it is difficult to imagine a management 3 We use IXI wealth code for non-retirement financial wealth. IXI wealth code is generated by the IXI Corporation. It is a categorical measurement of household non-retirement financial assets based on ZIP code. We collapsed the original wealth classes into three groups: Poor (wealth<$7,280), Medium ($7,280 to $61,289) , and Rich (>$61,289).
consultant living in Manhattan discussing her pension portfolio with a supermarket manager in Brooklyn, New York.
The richness of our dataset allows us to focus on social interaction within coworkers. For our study, we define "co-workers" as those people who work for the same employer, enroll in the same 401(k) plan, and live in the same MSA. 4 In what follows, we use the word "workplace" in the following sections to denote participants in the same MSA and the same plan. Since each 401(k) plan has a unique investment choice menu, people in the same workplace are hypothesized to be likely to discuss 401(k) investment performance with their co-workers. It is also plausible to assume that an individual has a closer relationship with his co-workers than with random people living in the same city.
As a result, since we can identify coworkers, this study has an advantage over previous studies in its ability to cleanly explore social interaction effects.
The entire dataset spans the period January 2005 to December 2009, and over 1.7 million employees participated in those plans at some time during the sample period. We randomly selected 10%, or 173,923 of these participants, to follow for our study, which covers 614 plans and 279 MSAs. In Panel A of Table 1 , we report the demographic and financial characteristics of the participants, which we use as controls in the multivariate regression analysis below.
Table 1 here
The main goal of this paper is to study the relationship between individual participants' equity holdings and the past equity returns received by people in the same workplace. Every plan in our sample has at least one bond or money market fund, one balanced fund, and one pure equity fund in the menu to choose from, so that every participant observed could elect an equity ratio ranging from 0% to 100%. The fraction of dollars invested in equity in each participant's 401(k) account balance is measured at the end of each quarter, along with the same statistics for every participant in his workplace.
We construct each person's "workplace level equity ratio" by averaging the equity ratio of all other participants in that workplace that quarter. (We weight by participant instead of assets as social interaction occurs between individuals rather than dollars.) Similarly, we construct the "workplace level equity return" by averaging the quarterly return on equity funds of each participant in the same workplace.
We measure the equity exposure of each participant in our sample at the end of every quarter. On average, a participant stays in the plan for close to 12 quarters within our sample period. This gives us a total of 1,933,592 observations in our regression analysis. In Panel B of Over the period examined, equity returns were quite volatile and included both a bull market and a deep financial crisis. Accordingly, the highest quarterly equity return observed at the workplace level exceeded 40%, while the lowest was -26%. On average, the quarterly workplace level equity return was just 25 basis points.
IV. Methods and Identification

A Baseline Model
The baseline model used to explore peer effects on individual portfolio risk exposure posits that an individual's equity fraction in his 401(k) portfolio is affected by the average equity holding of other workers in the same workplace. This approach is similar to that used by Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) , who examined peer effects among mutual fund managers. Pooling the data from January 2005 to December 2009 and denoting that an individual i works in plan p, city c, we run the following regression:
where Yp,c,i,t denotes the equity ratio of individual i's portfolio at the end of period t (and Yp,c,i,t-1 is the same except lagged); Qp,c,-i,t-1 denotes the participant-weighted average pastperiod equity ratio of the portfolios held by individual i's peers; Rp,c,i,t-1 denotes the individual's return on equity in the past period. Y'p,c,i,t denotes the 'hypothetical equity ratio' of the individual's portfolio at the end of period t in the case that he kept his asset allocation unchanged from the end of period t-1. To understand this approach, consider an example that a person has $10,000 in his 401(k) account at the end of past period. He invested 50% of his assets in an equity fund, while the other half is put in a bond fund.
Suppose that the equity fund earns 10% return over the current period, while the bond fund earns 0% return. At the end of the period, he will have $5,500 in equity and $5,000
in bond, hence an equity ratio of 52.7%. Even though the person did not change his asset allocation in the current period, his equity ratio still changes because of different returns from different funds. Hence, simply taking the difference of the current period equity ratio and the past period equity ratio on the left hand side of the equation would give us a biased equity ratio change. To solve this problem, we construct the hypothetical equity ratio. We use the difference of true equity ratio and hypothetical equity ratio as the dependent variable. We control for an individual's own lagged equity exposure, as we hypothesize that each person's own risk attitude is still the main determinant of his equity exposure, and should be relatively consistent over time. The interaction of individual current period equity return and past period equity ratio is also included, in order to control for the equity ratio change that is induced by the individual's own equity return.
Z(i) represents individual demographic and financial characteristics. We control for a large group of individual factors, including age, plan tenure, gender, household income, non-retirement financial wealth, and web access to the 401(k) account. We also include plan dummies F(p), MSA dummies F(c), and time dummies F(t) to control for workplace (2005)'s finding, this does not tell us that there is no social interaction effect in our study. As Manski (1993) points out, such a baseline model suffers from a serious identification problem, which will produce spurious results which shall not be interpreted as social interaction effects.
Table 2 here
Suppose there exists an unobserved variable Up,c,t-1 that affects everyone's portfolio choice in the same workplace, then the 'true' model would be:
where Qp,c,-
Plugging equation (3) into (2) gives us
In this case, social interactions would not have a direct effect on people's portfolio choices, but instead, an apparent 'correlation' between Y and Q in the baseline model might be due to an omitted unobserved variable U. 5 Even if we controlled for plan and workplace fixed effects as well as time dummies, there could still be other unobserved factors such as changes in the information set or economic environment to a workplace that may affect participants' portfolio choice. As a result, we cannot interpret the positive correlation as a causally social interaction effect.
Use peer returns on equity as identification
To identify a convincing causal pathway for social interaction effects on 401(k)
participant equity exposure patterns, we next turn to outcome-based social influence as an identification strategy to analyze peer effects in the 401(k) universe. People do not just merely copy others' behaviors, but rather they adopt the strategies that yield the best results. Such outcome-based social interaction has been documented in other fields (Bandura and Walters 1963, Call and Tomasello 1994) , and has been theoretically modeled in economics Fudenberg 1993, 1995; Banerjee and Fudenberg 2004) . In the present context, we hypothesize that 401(k) participants are more likely to increase their equity exposure after they observe high peer equity returns.
This approach was followed by Kaustia and Knupfer (2011) to explore peer effects in stock market participation in Finland. Using microeconomic data on all Finns, they report that positive returns earned by people living in a given neighborhood were correlated with more stock market participation in the neighborhood in the following month. In contrast, we analyze peer return effects at the workplace. Moreover, since most of our 401(k) participants hold some equity (versus the 10% market participation rate in the Kaustia and Knupfer (2011) ), there are far fewer people likely to be new equity investors. We examine the change in equity exposure across the whole set of employees as follows: Our main hypothesis is that if social interaction has an effect on individual equity exposure, then higher peer returns are more likely to induce individuals to increase their own equity shares. Thus, the coefficient b1 should be positive and significant if outcomebased social interaction occurs. Since participants can only know their peers' returns by talking to one another, we explicitly identify the social interaction effect with this approach. We regress the dependent variable on the lagged return and the equity ratio to eliminate the possibility of reverse causality. It is possible that increased inflows into equity funds could result in higher returns on the funds held by participants in the same
workplace, but such a scenario would not have any effect on lagged return and equity ratios. Furthermore, there may be time-varying shocks producing positive correlations between local returns and equity exposure. When the market's return is high, media coverage of the stock market may increase, capturing some investors' attention, and leading to a higher risky share. To rule out this possibility and other possible timevarying influences, we include quarter dummy variables in our regression.
There may also be time-invariant local unobserved variables that influence individuals' equity exposure. For example, people in different cities may have different levels of financial literacy, which leads to different levels of equity exposure. Such a possibility would not influence the relationship between peer returns and participant equity ratios. In any event, we eliminate all such influences by controlling for geography with Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) dummy variables.
Another possibility is that people in the same plan may experience common shocks. A plan sponsor may decide to provide more information on financial planning to its plan members when the market's return is high. Furthermore, each plan has a different menu of investment options, and an individual may only elect the funds offered in his own plan. To eliminate this effect we control for plan dummy variables. Finally, we cluster at the workplace level for robust standard errors. Table 3 shows coefficient estimates from regressing individual equity exposure levels on lagged peer equity return. Column 1 omits lagged peer equity ratio; Column 2 provides the full model. As we can see, our main variable of interest, the lagged peer equity return, has a positive impact on the dependent variable, as expected. After incorporating the full model, the coefficient of lagged peer equity return equals 0.148.
Table 3 here
It is interesting to see that the individual's own past period return has a negative and statistically significant impact on his current period change in equity exposure. One concern is that own past period returns might be highly correlated with peers' past period returns. We find that the simple correlation of own and peer past period equity returns is 0.86, while the correlation of these two variables conditional on all the other control variables is 0.54. This seems to suggest that there exists some multicollinearity between these two variables.
This, however, is not a major concern, as the OLS estimator, even in the presence of multicollinearity, is still the best linear unbiased estimator. Multicollinearity can increase the variation of the regressors, making the estimates inefficient. Yet, even with higher variance, the coefficient of our main variable of interest remain statistically significant, suggesting that peer return has a positive impact on individual 401(k)
investor's equity exposure change. Specifically, holding market effects and individual's own past period equity return constant, our result translates to a .5 percentage point increase in the individual equity ratio, given a one standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable. This suggests that, while people still mainly follow the status quo regarding risk exposure, there are peer influences on 401(k) participant equity holdings.
Impact of peer return at different levels on participant equity ratio
Simply regressing 401(k) participant equity exposure on peer equity return may not tell the whole story. One reason is that prior studies have noted that people are more likely to discuss their success stories than their failures, out of a desire to maintain selfesteem (Festinger, 1957, Benabou and Tirole, 2002) (Kahneman, 1973) and may use simple heuristics to make financial decisions.
Hou and Moskowitz (2005), Cohen and Frazzini (2008), Menzly and Ozbas (2010) , and Cen, Chan, Dasgupta, and Gao (2009) find that investors can be inattentive to useful information in financial markets, and such inattention can lead to over-reaction to some information. Yuan (2008) reports that stock investors' trading behavior is affected by attention-grabbing events such as record-breaking market indexes and front page articles. Thus, a high level of peer excess return on equities is more likely to capture an individual's attention and lead him to increase his own equity holdings. Kaustia and Knupfer (2011) provide empirical evidence that people are much more likely to participate in the stock market when peer returns are large and positive. Likewise, an individual may also reduce his equity ratio when his peers experience strong negative returns.
To explore this phenomenon in the defined contribution arena, we modify our model by disaggregating workplace equity returns following Kaustia and Knupfer (2011) . 
New Entrants or Re-entrants into Equity Funds
Thus far we have focused on exploring how past period peer returns affect 401(k)
investors' equity exposure. Yet we are also interested in a subset of these investors, namely those who did not invest in equity in the past period. In this section, we investigate whether these participants are affected by their peers' returns in deciding whether to invest in equity funds. This serves two purposes. First, using this sample, we can directly compare our results to previous studies on stock market participation.
Second, people with no equity investment last quarter have no prior period equity return, and hence, we need not be concerned about multicollinearity problem as discussed in section 4.2.
We explore whether past period peer returns affect the probability of investing in equity funds for people with no prior-quarter equity investment; our sample size is of 166,685 observations. As shown in Panel A of Table 5 , about 7% of such investors newly contribute to equity funds each quarter. Kaustia and Knupfer (2011) report that only around 0.1% of people enter into the Finland stock market each month. As we have discussed, lower barriers to investing in equity funds in U.S. 401(k) plans make it possible for more participants to move into equity funds. Table 5 here
In Panel B, we report OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the probability of new entrants or re-entrants into equity funds in a quarter. Here past period equity returns have a statistically significant effect on the probability of non-equity investors entering the equity market. The coefficient on the peer return variable is a statistically significant 0.005, meaning that a one standard deviation increase in peer return is associated with an increase of 1.35 percentage points in the probability of entering the equity market. Our result therefore translates to a 20% increase in new equity fund entrants, which is economically significant. This result is similar to Kaustia and Knupfer (2011) who report an almost one percentage point increase in the probability of buying stocks, given a one standard deviation increase in peer stock returns.
Disaggregating peer returns into several groups, we again find that people are more likely to contribute to equity funds when their peers have earned strongly positive returns. On the other hand, negative peer returns strongly deter non-equity investors from entering the equity market.
Heterogeneity Analysis
Interacting peer return and peer equity ratio
Having found that social interaction in the workplace can have a significant impact on equity exposure when peer returns are high or low, we now explore whether the impact varies across workplace settings. Here we draw on Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) Kaustia and Knupfer (2011) . The reason given is that people are more likely to find someone willing to talk to them about investments when community participation rates are higher.
Our setting, however, is different from the prior studies since most of our 401(k) participants already have stock exposure. In Figure 2 , we show the distribution of the proportion of employees holding equity at the workplace level. In our sample, more than 90% of the workplaces have more than three-quarters of their employees holding equity assets in their 401(k) accounts, while only around 1% of the workplaces have less than half of their employees investing in equity. A model that is better suited to our context is therefore the gradual information diffusion model based on word-of-mouth communication proposed by Hong, Hong, and Ungureanu (2010) . They suggest that information will diffuse at an increasing rate when only a small fraction of investors know the news, but the diffusion rate drops after a certain proportion of the population is informed. 6 Given that almost everyone in a workplace invests in some equities, it is plausible to hypothesize that a worker will have information on his peer's equity investments, regardless of the workplace's level of equity exposure. Hence, a higher peer equity ratio shall not have a larger effect on the change in an individual's equity exposure.
Figure 2 here
Specifically, we estimate the following model:
where Y, Q, Rp,c,i,t, Z(i), F(p), F(c), and F(t) still denote the same variables as in equation
(1). Peer equity return R is divided into six dummies as specified previously. Our main interest lies in the coefficient b1, which can be used to explore how peer returns influence participant equity ratios in workplaces having different equity exposure. Table 6 reports the results of this model, with Column 1 showing the interaction between workplace equity ratio and workplace equity return. Column 2 and Column 3 have workplace equity ratio interacted with different return groups. Evidently the interaction terms for the interaction between workplace equity ratio and the top two groups of workplace equity return are positive and statistically significant. Yet the interaction of the workplace equity ratio and the workplace equity return has little impact on individual equity exposure. Specifically, consider two identical workplaces, one with an equity ratio of 70%, and the other with an equity ratio of 60%. Our result implies that when employees in both workplaces enjoy a quarterly equity return greater than 4 percent, a participant in the first locale would only boost his equity ratio 0.6 percentage points more than someone in the second. Alternatively, if they both suffer a quarterly equity return below -4 percent, a participant in the second workplace would decrease his equity ratio 0.3 percentage points more than someone in the first. The coefficients on the other interaction categories are mostly statistically insignificant. Table 6 here One potential explanation of such a phenomenon is that the workplace equity ratio may be proxying for risk aversion. People who are more risk loving are more likely to hold higher proportion of equity. They are also more likely to increase their equity share when stock market is rewarding them well. Thus high peer returns in workplaces with higher equity exposure have larger effects than in workplaces with higher equity exposure, consistent with our regression results.
In summary, the results suggest that people in workplaces with higher equity ratios will increase their equity exposure faster than those in workplaces with lower equity ratios when they experience a positive shock on equity return. They will also decrease their equity exposure slower when they experience a negative shock on equity return. Such an effect does not occur when returns are normal.
Interacting peer return and workplace size
It is also possible that workplaces of different sizes might have different social interaction effects on investments. That is, people in small workplaces are more likely to have close relationships with a larger proportion of their colleagues, leading to stronger peer effects in those workplaces. However, a person in a large workplace may have opportunities to encounter people, hence having more communication about 401(k) investment. Therefore, how workplace size impacts the magnitude of social interaction on the topic of investments is worth further exploration.
To do so we estimate the gollowing model:
Yp,c,i,t -Y'p,c,i,t = a + b1 * Qp,c,i,t-1 + b2 * Rp,c,-i,t-1 + b3 * Sp,c,t-1 + + b4 * [Sp,c,t-1 * Rp,c,-i,t-1] + b5 * Rp,c,i,t-1 + b6 * Z(i) +
where Sp,c,t-1 denotes the log-normalized workplace size. In order to examine whether workplace size influences the magnitude of social interaction, workplace size is also interacted with peer equity return. The other variables denote the same constructs as before. Figure 3 shows the distribution of observations among different workplaces sizes.
While the majority of the workplaces in our sample are small (close to 80% of all workplaces have fewer than 100 employees), most of the observations come from medium to large workplaces.
Figure 3 here
Regression results appear in Table 7 . As Column 1 shows, workplace size does not have an impact on individual equity exposure. This result still holds when we interact workplace size with workplace equity return, as shown in Column 2. The main variables of interest here are the interactions between workplace size and past period workplace equity returns. Column 2 shows that workplace size does not have an impact on the magnitude of social interaction effects. In Column 4 and Column 6, after interacting with different categories of peer returns, some of the coefficients become negative and statistically significant, suggesting that social interaction may have a stronger effect in smaller workplaces. Overall, however, there is no strong evidence that workplace size has a substantial impact on social interaction effects. 
V. Robustness Checks
Having demonstrated that social interaction influence 401(k) plan participants' equity exposure, we next evaluate several additional hypotheses. First, when the market return is high and investors' 401(k) assets increase, an employer might invite a financial advisor to give a lecture on personal financial planning, leading more people to have a better understanding of the market and as a result, increase their equity shares. But such a workplace-level financial literacy broadcast story is unlikely to explain our results. A major financial turmoil occurred during our analysis period, giving the equity market a strong negative shock and leaving many 401(k) participants worried about their retirement assets. It is more plausible to hypothesize that employers provide financial literacy training during periods when equity returns are low. Yet we show that people decrease their equity exposure in response to negative workplace equity returns, usually not considered an optimal investment strategy. This suggests that our result is unlikely to be driven by such a mechanism.
Furthermore, a financial lecture, if it occurs, is more likely to be held in a large workplace because of the economies of scale. In the last section, we show that workplace size does not have much impact on the social interaction effect. One might still suspect that the result could be driven by strong peer effects in small workplaces and financial literacy classes in large workplaces. To check for this, we exclude all the observations from small and large workplaces and re-run our main model, denoting 'small' workplaces as those with fewer than 100 workers, and 'large' as those with more than 3,000 workers.
Hence, we only include individuals in workplaces that have between 100 and 3,000
employees. In Column 1 and Column 2 of Table 8 , we report the results, which are largely in line with the results from the full sample. Table 8 here
Workplace level equity returns might also be positively correlated with employee changes in wealth levels: that is, higher wealth could lead employees to invest more of their retirement savings in risky assets. Since we control for fixed effects from MSAs and plans, we eliminate the possibility of city-level and plan-level wealth shocks driving our results. Hence, such a story assumes that the correlation between peer equity returns and individual equity ratios would require a workplace-specific wealth shock. This scenario is also highly unlikely, as the 401(k) plan menus consist of diversified mutual funds and not individual stocks. Nevertheless some plans in our sample include own company stock funds in their plan menus. As a robustness check, we eliminate all the plans with company stocks from our sample and re-run the regression with results shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 . The magnitudes of the variables of our main interest, the workplace return in excess of 4% as well and lower than -4% in Column 4, are actually larger than the results using the whole sample. This strongly suggests that our results are not driven by workplace-level wealth shocks.
Even without locally-held stocks, the broad change in stock market returns may still affect individuals' wealth, and change their risk aversion levels. However, we control for individual equity return and lagged equity exposure, so these effects should be fully incorporated, and should not affect our results.
Another possible scenario is that workplace workers may have information on the specific funds that they are investing in. They may adjust their equity exposure based upon their knowledge of the funds and predict persistent returns when funds experience excess positive or negative returns. For example, if a fund portfolio manager changes, this could be correlated with fund return, as well as individual equity exposure. Even if true, this would not affect our identification as we control for individual lagged equity exposure and current period return. Nevertheless, we test whether past period workplace equity return predicts current period return. Specifically, we estimate the model:
where Rp,c,t is the current period workplace equity return. Past period workplace equity return Rp,c,t-1 is divided into six dummies as specified previously. Table 9 reports the regression results. As we can see from Column 2, after controlling for market trends, past workplace return exceeding 4% predicts 22 basis points higher return in the current quarter versus the reference group. This seems to suggest that increasing equity exposure after peers enjoy excess return on equities is a good strategy. However, past peer return lower than -4% has no impact on current period return comparing to the reference group.
Thus, there is no welfare gain in decreasing equity exposure after low peer returns.
Overall, these results suggest that the private information story discussed above is unlikely to drive our main results. 
VI. Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence that social interactions in the workplace influence equity exposure for 401(k) plan participants. Our empirical strategy allows us to cleanly identify the effect of social interactions and eliminate other potential possibilities that may drive our results. Specifically, holding other variables constant, we find that equity exposure in individual retirement accounts rises by 1.4 percentage points on a base of 68% when peer equity returns increase by greater than four percent in a quarter. Similarly, when peer equity returns decrease by at least four percent, equity ratio of individual investors fall by 0.9 percentage points. Virtually no change is observed when peer equity return is moderate. These results are consistent with the limited attention hypothesis, which states that people are more likely to pay attention when their peers discuss extreme outcomes. Furthermore, we find that the probability of new entrants into equity funds significantly increases when peer equity returns are high, similar to previous studies on non-401(k) stock market entrants. We also find that when peer returns are high, people in workplaces with higher equity exposure boost their equity shares faster than those in lower equity exposure environments, they also shift their assets away from equity slower when peer returns are low. We hypothesize that heterogeneity of risk aversion across workplaces may drive these results. In the future, we plan to explore whether such social interaction effects are beneficial to individuals' retirement wealth accumulation.
Such investment behavior may have an impact on asset prices. For instance, extrapolating positive peer outcomes might contribute to asset price bubbles, while extrapolating negative peer outcomes could exacerbate trends toward market collapse. It will be interesting to apply a similar methodology to other financial markets for further analysis. This table reports participant and workplace descriptive statistics. Panel A reports demographics and financial characteristics for plan participants in our sample. Each individual's age, sex, plan tenure, household income, non-retirement financial wealth, 401(k) assets, and web registration status is counted at the first month when he or she appears in the sample. "Plan tenure" is the number of years a person has been enrolled in the plan. Financial wealth is calculated using IXI wealth code, provided by the IXI Corporation. "401(k) assets" is the dollar amount of assets in the participant's 401(k) account. "Web registration" is an indicator of whether a person has web access to his 401(k) account. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for participants' own equity holdings and also the average peer equity ratio and equity return. "Workplace" includes all plan participants who live in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). "Participant equity ratio" is the percentage of dollars invested in equity in the participant's 401(k) account. "Workplace equity ratio" is the participant-weighted average percentage of equity holdings in an workplace. Both numbers are counted at the end of each quarter. "Workplace equity return" is the participant-weighted average return on equity funds in each quarter. This table uses as the dependent variable the percentage of dollars invested in equity in individual 401(k) accounts by quarter (T). "Workplace equity ratio in quarter T-1" is the participantweighted average equity ratio of the same workplace in quarter T-1. "Lagged dependent variable" is the dependent variable in quarter T-1. "Own return in quarter T" is the individual's return on equity funds in quarter T. Lagged dependent variable is interacted with the individual's own equity return in quarter T. We control for individual demographic and financial characteristics (see Table 1 ). "Time fixed effects" are dummy variables for each quarter. "MSA fixed effects" are dummy variables for each MSA. "Plan fixed effects" are dummy variables for each plan. We cluster standard errors at the workplace level for robustness. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are also reported. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. This table uses the same dependent variable as in Table 2 . "Workplace average equity return in quarter T-1" is the participant-weighted average return on equity funds in quarter T-1. Refer to Table 2 for the descriptions of other independent variables. Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. This table uses as the dependent variable whether the participant invest in equity funds in quarter T, given that he has no equity exposure in quarter T-1. In Column 2, the return is divided into three groups, with the reference group being the return between -4% and 4%. In Column 3, the return is divided into six categories, with the reference group being the return between 0 and 2%. Other variables are defined in Table 2 . Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. Table 2 . In Column 1, the workplace return is divided into two groups based on whether the return is positive. In Column 2, the return is divided into three groups, with the reference group being the return between -4% and 4%. In Column 3, the return is divided into six categories, with the reference group being the return between 0 and 2%. Other variables are defined in Table 2 . Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. Table 2 (see Table 4 for descriptions of other variables). In Column 3, workplace equity ratio is interacted with each category of workplace Table 2 . In Column 5 and Column 6, the return is divided into six categories, with the reference group being the return between 0 and 2%. Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. Table 2 , but with different samples. In Column 1 and Column 2, the sample only includes participants in workplaces with between 100 to 3,000 employees. In Column 3 and Column 4, the sample only includes participants in plans without company stock funds. In Column 2 and Column 4, the return is divided into six categories, with the reference group being the return between 0 and 2%. Other variables are defined in Table 2 . Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. This table uses as the dependent variable the current period workplace equity return. In Column 1, the main explanatory variable is the past period workplace equity return. In Column 2, the past period equity return is divided into six categories, with the reference group being the return between 0 and 2%. Other variables are defined in Table 2 . Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. This figure shows the distribution of the proportion of workers holding equity at the workplace level. We divide workplaces into 6 categories: Those with nobody holding equity; less than 50% of employees holding equity; between 50% and 75% of employees holding equity; between 75% and 90% of employees holding equity; more than 90% of employees holding equity; and all employees holding equity. The X-axis lists the categories. The Y-axis shows the percentage of observations in each category. This figure shows the distribution of observations in different size of workplaces. We divide workplaces into seven categories: Those with less than or equal to 10 people; with 11 to 100 people; with 101 to 500 people; with 501 to 1,000 people; with 1,001 to 3,000 people; with 3,001 to 10,000 people; and with more than 10,000 people. The X-axis lists the categories. The Y-axis shows the percentage of observations in each category.
